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ABSTRACT
The law of informed consent in medicine has evolved from the
original doctrine which required the physician’s disclosure of the risks,
benefits, and complications of (and alternatives to) a proposed procedure or treatment. The doctrine now implicates the disclosure of matters personal to the physician. Questions regarding the breadth of the
doctrine in other respects have developed as well. This paper represents
the author’s second examination of the unconventional aspects of the
law of informed consent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, I authored what I intended as a comprehensive
paper on the “unconventional” aspects of informed consent, largely
focusing on matters more personal to the “disclosing” physician. 1 Since
that time, other authors have commented on these matters. 2 As the law of
informed consent has developed, courts have recently considered different
informed consent issues unrelated to the typical required disclosure. In
light of these decisions, I have concluded that it is time to revisit the
unconventional and other selected topics of informed consent.
II. A DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
At the outset, it should be noted, medicine and law have conflicting
opinions about the gist of informed consent. I have written “that medicine
views informed consent as a communicative process with patient
1. Marc D. Ginsberg, Informed Consent: No Longer Just What the Doctor Ordered? The
“Contributions” of Medical Associations and Courts to a More Patient Friendly Doctrine, 15 MICH.
ST. J. MED. & L. 17 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent: Expanding the Boundaries of
Materiality, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 821 (2016); Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. et al., Must Physicians Disclose
an Alcohol or Substance Abuse Problem when Requesting a Patient Sign an Informed Consent Document? 91 N.D. L. REV. 309 (2015).
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involvement.” 3 The law of informed consent largely recognizes consent
as a disclosure doctrine; the best evidence of which is the well-known
Canterbury v. Spence, footnote 36: 4
We discard the thought that the patient should ask for information before
the physician is required to disclose. Caveat emptor is not the norm for
the consumer of medical services. Duty to disclose is more than a call to
speak merely on the patient’s request, or merely to answer the patient’s
questions; it is a duty to volunteer, if necessary, the information the
patient needs for intelligent decision. The patient may be ignorant,
confused, overawed by the physician or frightened by the hospital, or
even ashamed to inquire. Perhaps relatively few patients could in any
event identify the relevant questions in the absence of prior explanation
by the physician. Physicians and hospitals have patients of widely
divergent socio-economic backgrounds, and a rule which presumes a
degree of sophistication which many members of society lack is likely
to breed gross inequities. 5

The distinction between the medical and legal models of informed consent
is significant. For example, if a patient is involved in a conversation with
a physician about a proposed procedure or treatment and asks the
physician for information which the physician misrepresents, the patient
may have a misrepresentation claim, not an informed consent claim. 6
However, a physician’s failure to make a required disclosure yields an
informed consent claim.
III. INFORMED CONSENT—MYTH OR REALITY?
Before navigating the boundaries of informed consent, I should
confess my concern that true informed consent is a fiction. While I have
previously written on this topic, 7 I am certainly not a pioneer in this area.
Informed consent has been explored and subjected to legal and medical

3. Marc D. Ginsberg, Beyond Canterbury: Can Medicine and Law Agree About Informed
Consent? And Does it Matter?, 45 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 106, 108 (2017) (citing Christine Grady,
Enduring and Emerging Challenges of Informed Consent, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 855, 856 (2015)).
See also Charles G. Kels, Liability for Medical Battery in the Military Health System, 179 MIL. MED.
1, 1 (2014) (“[T]he doctrine of informed consent generally requires discussion.”).
4. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). But see Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d
429 (Pa. 2017) (recognizing informed consent as a dialogue).
5. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783 n.36 (citations omitted).
6. See Duffy v. Flagg, 905 A.2d 15, 23 (Conn. 2006). But see Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d
1244, 1260 (10th Cir. 2010) (predicting that “the Wyoming Supreme Court would allow an informed
consent claim where a physician lies to a patent as to physician-specific information in direct response
to a patient’s questions concerning the same in the course of obtaining the patient’s consent and the
questions seek concrete verifiable facts.” (emphasis omitted)).
7. Ginsberg, supra note 1.
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scholarship for quite some time. 8 My point is that a patient’s time with a
physician is brief; 9 the general literacy rate in the United States is not
particularly impressive; 10 the health literacy rate is lower yet; 11 and many
patients prefer not to participate in the healthcare decision-making. 12
These facts redirect the physician-patient relationship to medical
paternalism, the first target of the law of informed consent. My skepticism
aside, informed consent is an important and developing constituent of
medical-legal jurisprudence. These developments merit scrutiny and the
remainder of this paper focuses on these topics.
IV. THE NATURE OF THE INFORMED CONSENT CLAIM
A.

Informed Consent vs. Medical Battery

It is difficult to imagine that 60 years have passed from what is
believed to be the first reported informed consent judicial opinion. 13 Since
that holding, courts are required to explain the distinction between claims
sounding in medical battery and claims in informed consent. For example,
battery is an intentional tort.14 Medical battery occurs when a patient
receives unauthorized, unconsented treatment. 15 In contrast, an informed
consent claim arises when a physician fails to properly disclose
information to a patient that consented to treatment. 16
Lounsbury v. Capel 17 is a classic medical battery case. Lounsbury, a
construction worker, sustained a work related “compression fracture to
one of the vertebrae in his back.” 18 A treating physician opined that
8. See, e.g., Jay Katz, Informed Consent – Must it Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 69 (1994); Kenneth Boyd, The Impossibility of Informed Consent?, 41 J. MED.
ETHICS 44 (2015).
9. See Donna R. Rhoades et al., Speaking and Interruptions During Primary Care Office Visits, 33 FAM. MED. 528, 531 (2001).
10. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ADULT LITERACY IN AMERICA – A FIRST LOOK AT THE
FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ADULT LITERACY SURVEY, at xvi (2002).
11. See Xuewei Chen et al., Blending Health Literacy with an English as a Second Language
Curriculum: A Systematic Literature Review, 20 J. HEALTH COMM. 101, 101 (2015).
12. Wendy Levinson et al., Not All Patients Want to Participate In Decision Making, 20 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 531, 533 (2005).
13. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
14. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 52-53 (2000).
15. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 121 (3rd ed. 2015).
16. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Kellum, 975 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tenn. 1998) (discussing unauthorized dental extractions as a battery claim).
17. 836 P.2d 188 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
18. Id. at 189. For an excellent discussion of vertebral compression fractures, see Daniela
Alexandru & William So, Evaluation and Management of Vertebral Compression Fractures, 16
PERMANENTE J. 46 (2012); Am. Ass’n. Neurological Surgeons, Vertebral Compression Fracture,
http://www.aans.org/Patients/Neurosurgical-Conditions-and-Treatments/Vertebral-Compression-
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Lounsbury suffered “a herniated disc which was impinging on
Lounsbury’s nerves and causing him pain.” 19 His doctor suggested
surgery but Lounsbury desired a second opinion, resulting in a referral to
the defendant, Dr. Capel.
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals reveals that Lounsbury
twice refused to consent to surgery as he had not been advised of the
results of a pre-operative myelogram 20 and desired to speak with the
surgeon preoperatively. Apparently, Dr. Capel coerced Lounsbury’s wife
to consent for him while he was unconscious. “She assumed that [her
husband] had talked to Dr. Capel and had agreed to the surgery following
review of the myelogram.” 21
Lounsbury commenced a lawsuit for civil battery against Dr. Capel.
The trial court incorrectly concluded that Utah’s informed consent statute
governed Lounsbury’s claim against Dr. Capel for failure to obtain
informed consent. 22The trial court also stated Lounsbury could not
establish the requisite elements of the claim23 and entered Judgment
against Dr. Capel.
On appeal, the court of appeals noted the difference between
informed consent and battery claims. 24 The court of appeals importantly
stated:
It appears well settled that the battery theory remains applicable where
a medical treatment or procedure is completely unauthorized. . . . [W]e
find nothing in case law or secondary sources to suggest that the doctrine
of informed consent has displaced the common law remedy of battery in
cases of no consent. 25

The court of appeals held that Lounsbury had a viable medical battery

Fractures [https://perma.cc/TQQ8-AEXG] (“VCFs occur when the bony block or vertebral body in
the spine collapses, which can lead to severe pain, deformity and loss of height.”).
19. Lounsbury, 836 P.2d at 189.
20. Id. at 190. “A myelogram is a diagnostic imaging procedure done by a radiologist. It was
a contrast dye and X-rays or computed tomography (CT) to look for problems in the spinal canal.”
Myelogram, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/healthlibrary/test_procedures/neurological/myelogram_92,P07670 [https://perma.cc/4Y53-4SU8]; See also K. Lindblom,
Technique and Results in Myelography and Disc Puncture, 34 ACTA RADIOLOGICA 321 (1950);
Christop Ozdoba et al., Myelography in the Age of MRI: Why We Do It and How We Do It, 2011
RADIOLOGY RES. & PRAC. 1 (2011).
21. Lounsbury, 836 P.2d at 190.
22. Id. at 191 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1) (1987)) (containing the elements of an
informed consent claim).
23. Lounsbury, 836 P.2d at 191-92. The trial court also concluded that Lounsbury’s wife had
effectively consented for him and this consent constituted an “absolute defense” to the claim. Id. at
192.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 193-94.
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claim. Thus, the trial court’s judgment in favor of Dr. Capel was reversed
and remanded for further proceedings. 26
Despite the seemingly clear distinction between medical battery and
informed consent claims, the distinction needs to be clearer to courts and
counsel representing medical negligence claimants. Courts of last resort
have recently been required to re-educate counsel about the distinction. 27
Therefore, a battery claim involving a patient’s consent to surgical
procedure—allegedly performed incorrectly on the patient—implicated
medical negligence, not battery, 28 and an alleged failure to inform a
patient of all risks of a consented-to surgical procedure is, similarly, not a
battery. 29
B.

Misrepresentation vs. Informed Consent

Assume that during a physician’s typical informed consent
disclosure, the patient interrupts to inquire of the physician’s experience
or credentials. In response to the patient’s inquiry, the physician
knowingly provides false information to the patient. Will the physician’s
misrepresentation provide the predicate for an informed consent claim?
Not surprisingly, there is no consensus answer to this question.
Fraudulent misrepresentation claims commonly do not involve personal
injuries, 30 yet an action sounding in fraud under this factual scenario has
been endorsed. 31
In 2001, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a physician’s
misrepresentation of his surgical experience “in response to a specific
question posed by [a patient]” 32 did not yield an informed consent claim
but instead a claim for misrepresentation. 33 The court took the position
that “information personal to the physician, whether solicited by the
patient or not, is irrelevant to the doctrine of informed consent” 34 and
stated “that the doctrine of informed consent is not the legal panacea for

26. Id. at 199.
27. See Mayr v. Osborne, 795 S.E.2d 731 (Va. 2017); White v. Beeks, 469 S.W.3d 517 (Tenn.
2015); Humboldt Gen. Hosp. v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 376 P.3d 167 (Nev. 2016).
28. Mayr, 795 S.E.2d at 731.
29. White, 469 S.W.3d at 517.
30. See Laura Barke, When What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Third Party Liability for
Fraudulent Misrepresentation in Non-Commercial Settings After Doe v. Dilling, 888 N.E.2d 24 (Ill.
2008), 34 S. ILL. U. L. J. 201, 203 (2009).
31. Heyward H. Bouknight, III, Between the Scalpel and the Lie: Comparing Theories of Physician Accountability for Misrepresentations of Experience and Competence, 60 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1515, 1553 (2003).
32. Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1258 (Pa. 2001).
33. Id. at 1259.
34. Id.
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all damages arising out of any type of malfeasance by a physician.” 35
In 2002, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a physician’s
misrepresentation of his credentials as a board certified physician in
response to a specific inquiry (by the patient’s wife) would not support a
fraud claim, but would support an informed consent claim. 36 The court
emphasized that the “misrepresented or exaggerated physician experience
would have to significantly increase a risk of a procedure in order for it to
affect the judgment of a reasonably prudent patient in an informed consent
case.” 37
The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit weighed in on this
topic in Willis v. Bender. 38 In Willis, a patient sued a general surgeon for
medical negligence as he allegedly perforated the patient’s small bowel
during a laparoscopic gallbladder removal. 39 During the meeting in which
the patient’s history was taken and surgical options were discussed, the
patient:
asked Bender about his experience and track record with the
laparoscopic procedure, whether he had ever been sued and whether he
had ever had any problems with his medical license. Bender told [the
patient] he had never been sued, never had any problems with his
medical license and his success rate with the laparoscopic procedure was
“99.9% right on the mark.” 40

Postoperatively, the patient learned that her surgeon provided her false
information about prior lawsuits filed against him. He “had in fact been
sued several times, including by a family of a patient who had died after
undergoing a laparoscopic cholecystectomy performed by Bender in
2001.” 41 Essentially, this case focused on the issue of whether a physician
may lie to a patient “and then use that false information to secure a
patient’s consent.” 42
The court of appeals noted that the medical negligence claim was
based on diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, the informed consent issue
must be resolved pursuant to Wyoming law and the court “must attempt

35. Id.
36. Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 800 A.2d 73, 85-86 (N.J. 2002).
37. Id. at 85.
38. 596 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2010).
39. This surgical procedural complication is reported in the medical literature and is thought
to occur rarely. See Jay T. Bishoff et al., Laparoscopic Bowel Injury: Incidence and Clinical Presentation, 161 J. UROLOGY 887, 888 (1999); Ikennah L. Browne & Elijah Dixon, Delayed Jejunal Perforation After Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy, 2 J. SURG. CASE REP. 1 (2016).
40. Willis, 596 F.3d at 1247 (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 1248.
42. Id. at 1249-50.
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to predict how the Wyoming Supreme Court would resolve the issue.” 43
In examining the Wyoming law of informed consent, the court of appeals
identified Wyoming’s professional model of the doctrine, requiring a
physician “to disclose only such risks that a reasonable practitioner of like
training would have disclosed in the same or similar circumstances.”44
Wyoming law permitted an informed consent claim to be based on a
misrepresentation of the risks of treatment, 45 but the court of appeals
identified a split of authority on the issue of whether a physician “had a
duty to truthfully answer . . . physician specific questions.” 46 After
reviewing available authority from other jurisdictions, the court of appeals
predicted that the Wyoming Supreme Court would recognize an informed
consent claim because the defendant-physician’s “alleged
misrepresentations to [Plaintiff] in response to her direct questions
allegedly induced her to consent to the surgery and its risks.” 47 The
misrepresentations must be in response to “questions seek[ing] concrete
verifiable facts, not the doctor’s subjective opinion or judgment as to the
quality of his performance or abilities.” 48
Is the distinction between an informed consent claim based on a
negligent non-disclosure and one based on a fraudulent misrepresentation
an irrelevant difference? Certainly, a court could simply pronounce that
all material non-disclosures and misrepresentations, whether or not
responding to patient inquiries, will provide the predicate for an informed
consent claim. It should be remembered that classic fraudulent
misrepresentation claims do not require the establishment of a
professional standard of care and the use of expert witnesses. Therefore,
when analyzing an informed consent claim a court should consider the
physician’s disclosure to the patient, whether or not the patient inquires
of the physician. This type of analysis eliminates the problem of having
to expand the doctrine to include the subject matter of the patient’s
inquiry; inquiries typically not covered by the doctrine—physician
specific, personal information.
C.

Free Standing Informed Consent Claim—Is A Predicate Tortious

43.
44.

Id. at 1254.
Id. See also Ryan Childers et al., Informed Consent and the Surgeon, 208 J. AM. C.
SURGEONS 627, 629 (2009) (explaining the basic difference between the professional and reasonable
patient standard models).
45. Willis, 596 F.3d at 1255.
46. Id. at 1256.
47. Id. at 1258.
48. Id. at 1260.
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Injury Required?
It is well understood that:
Causation is established in an informed consent case if the plaintiff can
prove a link between the failure of a doctor to disclose and the patient’s
injury—first that the risk not disclosed in fact materialized, and second,
that a patient would have declined treatment if he had received full
information about that risk. 49

Nevertheless, recently, the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh
Circuit, in Looney v. Moore, 50 addressed an informed consent claim
without evidence of an injury.
Looney involved claims arising from a “national clinical research
trial . . . created to analyze the effects of differing oxygen saturation levels
on premature infants.” 51 The University of Alabama, Birmingham held
the trial. Plaintiffs, the research trial participants, claimed “that they
suffered serious injuries as a result of their participation in the study.” 52
Their claims, including lack of informed consent, were filed in a federal
court in Alabama. The defendants successfully moved for summary
judgment, 53 urging “that Plaintiffs had failed to prove that their injuries
were caused by participation in the . . . study, as opposed to being a
consequence of their premature births.” 54
On appeal, the court of appeals framed the free-standing informed
consent claim as follows:
As far as we can tell, however, Alabama law has yet to explicitly address
the question whether proof of a medical injury is also required before a
plaintiff can claim that his consent to a medical procedure was not
informed. Specifically, if a plaintiff cannot prove that he suffered any
injury as a result of a particular medical procedure, can he still
potentially prevail if he shows that the doctor failed to obtain his
informed consent to that procedure? In other words, is there a freestanding tort arising from a lack of informed consent, even if there is no
injury resulting from the procedure at issue? 55

The court of appeals certified the case to the Alabama Supreme Court for
guidance insofar as “Alabama law . . . does not expressly tell us whether
such an informed consent claim is subject to the same requirements as a
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
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malpractice or negligence claim, nor does it speak to what the elements of
such a claim would be if the claim finds no home in the
malpractice/negligence camp.” 56 The court of appeals looked to
inconsistencies in Alabama law as well as the law of other jurisdictions in
concluding that Alabama law was unsettled.
The following question was, therefore, certified to the Alabama
Supreme Court:
Must a patient whose particular medical treatment is dictated by the
parameters of a clinical study, and who has not received adequate
warnings of the risks of that particular protocol, prove that an injury
actually resulted from the medical treatment in order to succeed on a
claim that his consent to the procedure was not informed? 57

The court of appeals noted the certified question should be limited to
treatment in the context of a clinical study. The court of appeals may have
hoped that the Alabama Supreme Court, in answering the question, would
generally clarify Alabama’s law of informed consent. Regrettably, on
September 7, 2017, the Supreme Court of Alabama issued an order
“declin[ing] to answer the certified question.” 58
V. TO DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE
A.

The Uninsured Physician

Physicians are consumers of professional liability insurance. 59 As
with other liability insurance coverage, medical malpractice insurance
carries “the virtue[s] of spreading the risk of loss among many to make it
possible for the individual to bear the economic burden of adversity.” 60 In
addition to having to provide financial protection against potentially
successful medical negligence claims, 61 physicians may also be required
to demonstrate evidence of professional liability coverage as a condition
of obtaining hospital staff privileges. 62 Thus, obtaining professional

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 1314.
Lewis v. Moore, No. 1160893, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 149 (Ala. Sept. 7, 2017).
See Jonathan Thomas, The Effect of Medical Malpractice, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L.
ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 306, 311 (2010).
60. Melvin M. Belli, The Social Value of Liability Insurance, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 169, 169
(1961).
61. Anupam B. Jena et al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 629 (2011).
62. See Brian M. Peters & Wendy Cherner Maneval., Medical Staff Membership Criteria: A
Credentialing Minefield, 5 MED. STAFF COUNSELOR 1, fn. 4 (1991); HEALTH CARE LITIGATION AND
RISK MANAGEMENT ANSWER BOOK 2015 306 (David S. Greenberg & Brian D. Schneider eds., 2015);

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss1/2

10

Ginsberg: Informed Consent

2018]

INFORMED CONSENT

59

liability insurance is a cost of doing business.
However, not all physicians opt for professional liability insurance
coverage. It has been reported that physicians who are uninsured choose
this path because of the high cost of insurance in an effort to limit their
potential exposure to professional liability. 63 The phenomenon of an
uninsured physician in Florida has received great attention in legal
scholarship. 64 In Florida, by virtue of a state statute, 65 “physicians who
opt to ‘go bare’ must display a sign in their office including a recognition
that they have elected not to carry medical malpractice liability
insurance.” 66
Should a physician have an obligation to disclose the lack of
professional liability insurance coverage to a patient in order to satisfy the
law of informed consent? In 2015, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
considered this question in Jarrell v. Kaul. 67 New Jersey requires
practicing physicians to have professional liability insurance coverage.68
The plaintiff Jarrell suffered from chronic back pain. 69 In 2005, Dr. Kaul,
a referral from Jarrell’s chiropractor, 70 “performed a spinal fusion 71
procedure at a surgical center” 72 after Dr. Kaul “diagnosed Jarrell with a

Sara Rosenbaum & Marilynn Sager, Unlocking the Hospital Doors: Medical Staff Membership and
Physicians Who Serve the Poor, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 46, 56 (1991) (discussing “adequate liability insurance” as a criteria for staff privileges). See also Kelly v. St. Vincent Hosp., 692 P.2d 1350
(N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (finding hospital has rational basis to require on-staff physicians to maintain
professional liability insurance).
63. Allen Kachalia et al., Physician Responses to the Malpractice Crisis: From Defense to
Offense, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 416 (2005).
64. Stephanie Hauser, The Default in Florida’s Tort Reform: How Bankruptcy Affects the
Meaning of Financial Responsibility, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233 (2010).
65. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320 (West 2014).
66. Hauser, supra note 64, at 242.
67. 123 A.3d 1022 (N.J. 2015).
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-19.17a. (2004).
69. For an excellent discussion of chronic back pain, see Richard A. Deyo et al., Overtreating
Chronic Back Pain: Time to Back Off?, 22 J. AM. BD. FAM. MED. 62 (2009) (noting that back pain is
the most common of musculoskeletal pain complaints). See also Gunnar B J Andersson, Epidemiological Features of Chronic Low-Back Pain, 354 LANCET 581 (1999) (noting the high frequency of
chronic back pain in the population).
70. “Chiropractic training focuses on the spine and emphasizes a particular therapeutic technique—spinal manipulation. . . . Chiropractors generally believe that most back pain is caused by
anatomic derangements in the spine, such as vertebral subluxations, that can be identified on a spinal
radiograph and effectively treated using spinal manipulation.” Daniel C. Cherkin & Frederick A.
MacCornack, Patient Evaluations of Low Back Pain Care from Family Physicians and Chiropractors, 150 W. J. MED. 351, 354-55 (1989).
71. See Stephen J. Lipson, Spinal-Fusion Surgery—Advances and Concerns, 350 N. ENG. J.
MED. 643 (2004).
72. Jarrell, 123 A.3d at 1024.
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herniated lumbar disc, 73 lumbar radiculopathy, 74 and discogenic back
pain 75” 76 Postoperatively, Jarrell experienced worsening pain and other
complications. 77 Jarrell’s friend referred him to a neurosurgeon. After
evaluating Jarrell, the neurosurgeon “concluded that Dr. Kaul improperly
placed some screws that pinched a nerve causing the pain and drop
foot.” 78 The neurosurgeon performed a reparative procedure, but
postoperatively, Jarrell continued to have pain and limited physical
activity. 79
Jarrell and his wife brought a multi-count claim against Dr. Kaul and
the surgical center where Dr. Kaul served as Medical Director. 80 Among
the claims Jarrell filed, one was for lack of informed consent, urging that
Dr. Kaul “knew that he was uninsured at the time he obtained Jarrell’s
consent to perform surgery,” 81 and that Dr. Kaul should have disclosed
his uninsured status to Jarrell as it “would have been significant in
[Jarrell’s] decision making.” 82 Dr. Kaul argued “that a physician’s duty to
obtain informed consent from a patient prior to undertaking medical
treatment is limited to the risks associated with the treatment, not whether
a patient may have a source to pay a monetary judgment in the event the
physician negligently discharges his professional duties.” 83
The New Jersey Supreme Court discussed the origin of the doctrine
of informed consent, by referring to an eighteenth century English
opinion. 84 The court stated, “there is reliable evidence that medical

73. See Jo Jordan et al., Herniated Lumbar Disc, 2011 BMJ CLINICAL EVIDENCE 1118 (2011)
(“Herniated lumbar disc is a displacement of the disc material . . . beyond the intervertebral disc
space.”).
74. See Andrew J. Schoenfeld & Bradley K. Weiner, Treatment of Lumbar Disc Herniation:
Evidence-Based Practice, 3 INT’L J. GEN. MED. 209, 209 (2010) (“The more treatable condition of
lumbar radiculopathy . . . arises when extruded disc material contacts, or exerts pressure, on the thecal
sac or lumbar nerve roots.”). See also Stephen E. Abram, Pain Mechanism in Lumbar Radiculopathy,
67 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 1135 (1988).
75. “Discogenic low back pain is non-radicular and occurs in the absence of spinal deformity,
instability and signs of neural tension. It arises from the disc itself and the mechanism of its production
is uncertain.” B. Peng et al., The Pathogenesis of Discogenic Low Back Pain, 87 J. BONE & JOINT
SURGERY 62, 62 (2005); Sohail K. Mizra et al., One-Year Outcomes of Surgical Versus Non-Surgical
Treatments for Discogenic Back Pain: A Community-Based Prospective Cohort Study, 13 SPINE J.
1421 (2013).
76. Jarrell, 123 A.3d at 1025.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1031.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1032.
84. Id. (citing Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (KB 1767)).
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informed consent dates back to ancient times.” 85 Furthermore, after noting
that the doctrine contemplates “a disclosure of the risks associated with
the recommended procedure and alternative procedures or therapies;”86
the court concluded that the disclosure of “whether [a physician]
maintains medical malpractice liability insurance, . . . is . . . ‘not a perfect
fit’ with our informed consent jurisprudence.” 87 The court noted that a
physician’s lack of professional liability insurance does not necessarily
derive from the physician’s lack of skill. 88 However, they did not address
the issue of whether an uninsured physician is more or less likely to
practice medicine carefully. Accordingly, the court decided that a
financial loss sustained by a patient “is not the injury that the informed
consent doctrine ever contemplated.” 89
The dissenting/concurring opinion clearly tethers the defendantphysician’s financial insecurity to his competence (incompetence),90 and
referred to the case facts as “present[ing] the quintessential case of lack of
informed consent.” 91 Without any citation to authority, the
dissent/concurrence further states:
A patient has a right to know whether a physician performing a
procedure is in a financially responsible position in the event that the
patient suffers injuries due to medical malpractice. A reasonable patient
would consider a physician’s lack of insurance a material factor in
making a decision whether to have spinal surgery. That is so because an
uninsured physician provides no financial safety net for a patient who is
harmed by the physician. Lack of insurance also may suggest that the
carrier considered the physician incompetent to perform the
procedure. 92

Neither the majority nor dissenting/concurring opinions address the
actual risk of the uninsured physician. Is this physician more likely to be
careful and avoid mistakes due to the possibility of personal, uninsured
liability? Or is the uninsured physician more likely to practice carelessly,
or with reckless abandon, on the assumption that the lack of professional

85. Ginsberg, supra note 1, at 19 (citing P. Dalla-Vorgio et al, Is Consent in Medicine a Concept only of Modern Times?, 27 J. MED. ETHICS 59, 59-61 (2001); Constantinos Trompoukis & John
Lascaratos, Surgical Operation During the Ottoman Period. Informed Consent According to Documents of the Ottoman Archives of Crete, 10 T. KLIN. J. MED. ETHICS, L. & HIST. 163, 163-67 (2002).
86. Jarrell, 123 A.3d at 1033.
87. Id. at 1034.
88. Id. at 1035.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1040.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1042.
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liability insurance somehow provides a level of comfort? 93 It has been
urged that there is a risk when addressing an uninsured physician who is
a co-defendant with an insured physician in medical negligence litigation.
The theory is the plaintiff’s counsel will attempt to influence the
uninsured co-defendant “to criticize the insured co-defendant physician in
deposition or at trial. Refusing to do so subjects the bare physician to
aggressive action by the plaintiff’s attorney and the potential for financial
ruin.” 94
Jarrell v. Kaul 95 may not be as cutting edge of an informed consent
opinion as much as it is an outlier. The facts of this case involve a boardcertified anesthesiologist who performed a procedure typically performed
by a neurosurgeon or orthopedic surgeon in a non-hospital setting.
Hospitals routinely require evidence of medical liability coverage as a
condition of staff privileges. As an informed consent case, however, the
scope of the disclosure cannot be without boundaries. A patient may be
interested to know that the procedure to which the patient is about to
submit may be negligently performed, yet this is not a disclosable risk. 96
Undoubtedly, other unconventional “risks” could be imagined. The “risk”
of the uninsured physician is fairly considered outside the bounds of
informed consent, although a debate on this topic is not without merit. 97
B.

Abortion

It is an understatement that abortion is a controversial and politically
charged topic in the United States. This paper is not the forum in which to
address divisive and quite significant legal issues on that topic. 98
However, interesting jurisprudence exists relating to the required
physician disclosure in connection with a first trimester abortion. 99
Specifically, the issue is whether the physician is obligated to advise the
patient that a first trimester abortion is a procedure which kills an alleged
93. It has been suggested that “[b]y insulating doctor from risks, insurance can also reduce
physicians’ incentive to exercise due care.” Charles Silver et al., Policy Limits, Payouts, and Blood
Money: Medical Malpractice Settlements in the Shadow of Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 559,
561 (2015) (no citation to authority supporting the authors’ statement).
94. Cliff Rapp, Risky Business: Practicing with Uninsured Physicians, www.sfcacs.org/fpic/risky_bus.pdf [https://perma.cc/HBM3-3QUP].
95. 123 A.3d at 1022.
96. See Ginsberg, supra note 1, at 62.
97. Even insured physicians risk “excess” verdicts. See Silver et al., supra note 93, at 567.
98. See Maya Manian., The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223 (2009); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First
Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physical Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939 (2007).
99. First trimester pregnancies have been defined as “gestations at 12 weeks from the last menstrual period or less.” Richard John Lyus et al., First Trimester Procedural Abortion in Family Medicine, 22 J. AM. BD. FAM. MED. 169 (2009).
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human being. 100
In Doe v. Planned Parenthood, 101 a nineteen-year old woman,
approximately 12 weeks pregnant, obtained counseling from Planned
Parenthood (PP). The operative facts are as follows:
[She] asked a PP counselor whether an abortion would terminate the life
of a human being in the biological sense. The counselor replied in the
negative. The plaintiff told the counselor that she had been informed by
a pregnancy help center that an abortion terminates the life of a human
being. The counselor replied that pregnancy help centers often
deliberately misrepresent the facts to prospective mothers. The
counselor assured her that an abortion did not terminate the life of a
human being. Given this assurance, the plaintiff decided to have an
abortion that same day. 102

Two years following the abortion, Plaintiff filed suit “individually
and on behalf of her aborted fetus . . . against the clinic, its doctors, and
its nursing/counseling staff,” 103 claiming that “the defendant had a duty to
inform her that an abortion ‘procedure would terminate the life of a second
patient, a living human being as a matter of biological fact.’” 104 Plaintiff
claimed that “but for the defendants’ failure to fully inform her of the
direct and collateral consequences of an abortion, she would not have
terminated her pregnancy.” 105 The court dismissed the complaint, holding
that there was “no duty to inform a patient . . . that an abortion terminates
the life of a human being in the biological sense as a matter of law.” 106
The appellate court referred to the Illinois common law of informed
consent 107 and to New Jersey jurisprudence 108 in concluding that “[n]o
court, regardless of where it sits, has found a common law duty requiring
doctors to tell their pregnant patients that aborting an embryo, or fetus, is

100. Doe v. Planned Parenthood, 956 N.E.2d 564 (Ill. 2011); Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416
(N.J. 2007).
101. 956 N.E.2d at 564.
102. Id. at 567.
103. Id.
104. Id. Plaintiff also claimed that “the defendants had duty to inform her there is a greater risk
of death, depression, suicide and breast cancer in women who undergo an abortion than in those who
give birth.” As to this issue, see John M. Thorp et al., Long-Term Physical and Psychological Health
Consequences of Induced Abortion: A Review of the Evidence, 72 LINACRE Q. 44 (2005); David C.
Reardon et al., Deaths Associated with Abortion Compared to Childbirth—A Review of New and Old
Data and the Medical and Legal Implications, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279 (2004).
105. Planned Parenthood, 956 N.E.2d at 568.
106. Id. Of course, whether a fetus is a human being is the subject of debate. See Soroush Dabbagh, Fetus as Human Being: Where is the Cut-off Point?, 2 J. MED. ETHICS & HIST. MED. 1 (2009).
107. Planned Parenthood, 956 N.E.2d at 568.
108. Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416 (N.J. 2007).
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the killing of an existing human being.” 109 Again referring to New Jersey
jurisprudence, 110 the appellate court essentially adopted the scope of the
informed consent disclosure to include “material medical information,
including gestational stage and medical risks involved in the
procedure.” 111
Previously, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Acuna v. Turkish, 112
considered a similar claim, very different than the facts in Doe. 113 Here,
the informed consent claim alleged “that Dr. Turkish breached a duty
owed to [Plaintiff] by failing to inform her of ‘the scientific and medical
fact that [her six-to eight-week-old embryo] was a complete, separate,
unique and irreplaceable human being’ and that an abortion would result
in ‘killing an existing human being.’” 114
Plaintiff’s obstetrician-gynecologist (ob-gyn), Dr. Turkish, had
previously delivered one of her children. 115 Plaintiff’s medical history
included a kidney problem which allegedly threatened her life unless she
had an abortion. 116 Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Turkish recommended she
have an abortion because of her condition, which Dr. Turkish denied. He
“claimed that Plaintiff introduced the subject of abortion as an option.” 117
In any event, Plaintiff later executed a consent for the abortion. “On the
form, plaintiff acknowledged that defendant ‘explained all of the risks and
complications to [her].’” 118 Dr. Turkish then “performed a vacuum
aspiration, 119 which ended the pregnancy.” 120
Subsequently, another doctor diagnosed Plaintiff with an incomplete
abortion, which he treated. 121 A nurse’s explanation of what occurred led
Plaintiff to believe “‘that [there] was a baby and not just blood’ inside of

109. Planned Parenthood, 956 N.E.2d at 572.
110. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 416.
111. Planned Parenthood, 956 N.E.2d at 573. There is medical scholarship reporting the complications of abortion. See E. Hakim-Elahi et al., Complications of First-Trimester Abortion: A Report
of 170,000 Cases, 76 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 129 (1990).
112. 930 A.2d at 416.
113. Planned Parenthood, 956 N.E.2d at 564.
114. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 418.
115. Id. at 419.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. “Manual vacuum aspiration (MVA) is a technique of suction curettage for first-trimester
abortion that has been performed for many years. It is performed using a handheld syringe attached
to a uterine catheter. It has been used internationally for many years and has been shown to be safe
and effective for early abortion, menstrual extraction, and completing incomplete abortions.” John M.
Westfall et al., Manual Vacuum Aspiration for First-Trimester Abortion, 7 ARCH. FAM. MED. 559,
559 (1998).
120. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 419.
121. Id.
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her.” 122 Plaintiff’s research caused her to conclude “that the abortion
procedures killed a ‘human being.’” 123
Plaintiff filed a claim “primarily focused on the theory of lack of
informed consent.” 124 Essentially, Plaintiff claimed that Dr. Turkish did
not disclose, among other things, that “abortion involved ‘actually killing
an existing human being.’” 125 A lengthy procedural history ensued, with
the following findings of the trial judge:
• By demanding that a physician advise a pregnant woman that her
non-viable embryo “is in all material respects equivalent to a person
born and alive,” plaintiff would require that the doctor convey “a
value judgment not a medical fact.” 126
• [Q]uestions of when life begins and whether a woman should
terminate a pregnancy “involved moral, philosophical, and
religious questions.” 127
• “[T]hose trained in the respective disciplines of medicine,
philosophy, and theology” have failed to reach a consensus about
when life begins. 128
• The law has left the question of whether to abort or go to term with
a non-viable embryo . . . “for each woman to decide for herself.” 129
• [A] physician is not required to advise a woman that her non-viable
embryo “is a living human being” to obtain her informed consent
for an abortion. 130

The state supreme court, after a lengthy discussion of the law of
informed consent, concluded that New Jersey’s common law did not
contemplate the duty to disclose urged by the plaintiff. 131 The court’s
decision is consistent with the informed consent policy of limiting the
required disclosure to medical facts directly related to the proposed
procedure or treatment.
C.

Detail of a Medical Procedure

Consider this frequent scenario: a patient consults a general surgeon
for a commonly performed surgical procedure—hernia repair,
appendectomy, or gallbladder removal. The informed consent disclosure
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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requires the surgeon to advise the patient of the recommended procedure,
but in how much detail? Medical literature is replete with the actual
procedural detail of the hernia repair, 132 appendectomy, 133 and
cholecystectomy, 134 but it is simply unreasonable for the surgeon to
expect that the patient seek this much detail and have the ability to
comprehend it. This puts the surgeon in a difficult situation. It has been
urged that the law of informed consent has “made it plain that it is not
appropriate to surrender the degree of detail to the sole judgment of the
medical profession itself.” 135 Yet, an equally cogent and realistic position
is that “[t]he real limits of patient . . . comprehension suggest[s] that it is
unreasonable to seek consent for every detail of a proposed treatment.” 136
What, then, is the obligation of the physician when explaining a medical
procedure to a patient?
Oregon, pursuant to statute, has given physicians, in part, a
reasonably clear path to the disclosure. Oregon’s informed consent statute
provides as follows:
ORS § 677.097
Procedure to obtain informed consent of patient
(1) In order to obtain the informed consent of a patient, a physician or
physician assistant shall explain the following:
(a) In general terms the procedure or treatment to be undertaken;
(b) That there may be alternative procedures or methods of treatment,
if any; and
(c) That there are risks, if any, to the procedure or treatment.
(2) After giving the explanation specified in subsection (1) of this
section, the physician or physician assistant shall ask the patient if the
patient wants a more detailed explanation. If the patient requests further
explanation, the physician or physician assistant shall disclose in
substantial detail the procedure, the viable alternatives and the material
risks unless to do so would be materially detrimental to the patient. In
determining that further explanation would be materially detrimental the
physician or physician assistant shall give due consideration to the
standards of practice of reasonable medical or podiatric practitioners in
the same or a similar community under the same or similar

132. B. Ramshaw et al., Laparoscopic Inguinal Hernia Repair, 15 SURGICAL ENDOSCOPY. 50
(2001).
133. Carol E. H. Scott-Conner et al., Laparoscopic Appendectomy – Initial Experience in a
Teaching Program, 215 ANNS. SURGERY 660 (1992).
134. Walter Reynolds, Jr., The First Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy, 5 J. SOC.
LAPAROENDOSCOPIC SURGEONS 89 (2001); Bruce D. Schirmer et al., Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy
– Treatment of Choice for Symptomatic Cholelithiasis, 213 ANNS. SURGERY 665 (1991).
135. M.D. Kirby, Informed Consent: What Does it Mean?, 9 J. MED. ETHICS 69, 73 (1983).
136. O. O’Neill, Some Limits of Informed Consent, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 4, 6 (2003).
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circumstances. 137

Pursuant to the statute, the procedure shall be explained in general
terms. 138 The statutory requirement then extends beyond the disclosure
doctrine for the character of informed consent requires the physician to
inquire of the patient if the patient desires additional detail. If the patient
opts for more detail, the Oregon informed consent process involves much
more of a communication or conversation than contemplated by the
classic informed consent doctrine. The Court of Appeals of Oregon in
1990 described the informed consent process. 139 More recently, the
Superior Court of Connecticut subscripted to a less detailed description of
a surgical procedure when it stated that, “a requirement under the nature
of procedure element of the informed consent cases that a doctor describe
a surgical procedure in great detail would place an impossible burden on
surgeons and make it difficult for reviewing courts to develop guidelines
to implement application of this nature of procedure element.” 140
Certainly, the amount and depth of detail to be disclosed by the
physician is not determinable by a formulaic application. A “general”
description of a proposed procedure or treatment seems realistic in terms
of time constraints and patient literacy.
D.

Non-Physician Participation in Surgical Procedure

Quite recently, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma considered what is,
hopefully, an aberrant factual scenario in Hurley v. Kirk. 141 Here, a
surgeon allowed a non-physician to perform a portion of a total
laparoscopic hysterectomy. 142 The patient consented to the procedure but
the surgeon never informed the patient that the person who would assist
in surgery had credentials as an EMT, surgical technician, LPN, and first
assistant, 143 but not as a physician. During the procedure, the patient
suffered various injuries and required corrective surgery. 144
The trial court resolved Plaintiff’s claim by summary judgment in

137. Procedure to Obtain Informed Consent of Patient, Or. Rev. Stat. § 677.097 (2017).
138. Id.
139. See Wenger v. Oregon Urology Clinic, 796 P.2d 376, 377 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
140. Ranciato v. Schwarts, No. NNHCV116023107S, 2014 WL 7497403, at *31 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Nov. 26, 2014).
141. 398 P.3d 7 (Okla. 2017).
142. This procedure is well explained in Jon I. Einarsson & Yoko Suzuki, Total Laparoscopic
Hysterectomy: 10 Steps Toward a Successful Procedure, 2 REVS. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 57
(2009).
143. Kirk, 398 P.3d at 9.
144. Id.
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favor of the defendants and the appellate court affirmed. 145 The state
supreme court referred to its informed consent jurisprudence in its holding
and held that the defendant surgeon owed a duty to the patient to disclose
the anticipated participation of a non-physician in the surgical procedure.
Specifically, the court stated:
Today, this Court reemphasizes that the scope of a physician’s
communications must be measured by his/her patient’s need to know
enough information to enable the patient to make an informed and
intelligent choice. In other words, full disclosure of all material risks
incident to treatment must be made. As such, no physician has carte
blanche to delegate any or all tasks to a non-doctor. To hold otherwise,
would obliterate a patient’s freedom of choice and reinstate the
paternalistic approach to medicine . . . . The scope of the duty to inform
is broad enough to include a physician’s duty to inform the patient
“who” will be performing significant portions of the procedure or
surgical tasks. 146

The opinion in Hurley, 147 in light of its facts, is quite reasonable. The
non-physician in the surgical procedure increased the patient’s risk of
surgical injury due to his participation. Accordingly, the patient was
entitled to know of this participant in advance of surgery and choose a
different surgeon.
E.

Physician Personal Life and Personal Decisions

Is a physician obligated to disclose to a patient that the physician is
allegedly having an affair with the patient’s wife? In 2012, the Court of
Appeals of Georgia answered. No. 148 In Witcher v. McGauley, 149 both
spouses were patients of the defendant-physician. Prior to the discovery
of the alleged affair, the defendant treated the husband-spouse “for
complaints including depression and anxiety.” 150 The defendantphysician diagnosed husband-spouse “with Attention Deficit Disorder
(ADD), which necessitated prescribing medication.” 151 The husbandspouse had advised the defendant-physician “that he thought ‘something
was not clicking right at home,’ which was causing him to have an
inability to focus on his work.” 152 His medical negligence and breach of
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 7.
Witcher v. McGauley, 730 S.E.2d 56 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id.
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fiduciary duty claims against the defendant-physician were based in part
on the alleged affair and resulting damages—divorce, the need to seek
psychiatric care, loss of employment, “mental and physical distress,
humiliation, and anguish.” 153 The court noted that the defendant-physician
“had no duty to disclose to his patient personal life factors, such as an
affair, that might adversely affect his professional performance.” 154
In Hooks v. Humphries, 155 the Court of Appeals of Georgia
considered an informed consent claim arising from a birth injury. During
Plaintiff’s pre-natal care, her ob-gyn advised her “that he no longer
delivered babies, that his medical treatment would be limited to her
prenatal care, and that he would refer her to another obstetrician for
delivery of the baby.” 156 When Plaintiff returned to see the defendant, he
advised Plaintiff “that her pregnancy was considered high risk based on
her age, her history of smoking, of complications in prior pregnancies,
and of failing to comply with doctor’s instructions.” 157 Her ob-gyn
referred Plaintiff to a specialist. 158 At a follow-up visit to the defendant,
he advised Plaintiff that she may have gestational diabetes. 159
The defendant ceased to provide care to Plaintiff. Other physicians
cared for the Plaintiff and, ultimately, she gave birth to a large baby,
which, “[d]uring the delivery . . . sustained a shoulder dystocia, 160 Erb’s
palsy, 161 and meconium aspiration syndrome 162” 163
Plaintiff commenced a medical negligence lawsuit against the
defendant, which resulted in a defense verdict at trial. 164 The trial court
previously granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant in

153. Id.
154. Id. at 63. For scholarship regarding sexual relationships between physicians and patients,
see Scott M. Puglise, Note, Calling Dr. Love: The Physician-Patient Sexual Relationship as Grounds
for Medical Malpractice – Society Pays While the Doctor and Patient Play, 14 J. L. & HEALTH 321
(1999-2000).
155. 692 S.E.2d 845 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
156. Id. at 847.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. See also, Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Gestational Diabetes Mellitus, 27 DIABETES CARE S 88
(2004) (defining gestational diabetes as any degree of glucose intolerance with onset or first recognition during pregnancy).
160. See Robert B. Gherman et al., Shoulder Dystocia: The Unpreventable Obstetric Emergency
with Empiric Management Guidelines, 195 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 657 (2006).
161. See Michael Chater et al., Erb’s Palsy – Who is to Blame and What Will Happen?, 9
PAEDIATR CHILD HEALTH 556 (2004).
162. See Robert Bacsik, Meconium Aspiration Syndrome, 24 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 463
(1977).
163. Hooks, 692 S.E.2d at 847.
164. Id. at 846.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 2

70

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:1

connection with a breach of fiduciary duty claim. 165 The essence of that
claim was the defendant’s failure “to disclose to [Plaintiff] the reasons he
no longer delivered babies.” 166 Apparently, Plaintiff’s counsel approached
the topic during the defendant’s deposition, when he “testified that he no
longer practiced in labor and delivery for ‘mostly personal and some
political reasons.’” 167
The court of appeals easily disposed of Plaintiff’s claim regarding
the non-disclosure. It held that a “physician has no duty to voluntarily
disclose negative information 168 about his personal life to patients . . .
even if the patient indicates that the information would have [been] useful
in determining whether to seek treatment elsewhere.” 169 Additionally, the
court of appeals indicated that the disclosure of personal matters was not
included in “the specific categories of information set forth in Georgia’s
informed consent statute.” 170
Plaintiff’s claim in Hooks surely defies logic. Once Plaintiff’s
physician advised her of the factors complicating her pregnancy,
including gestational diabetes, a referral to a maternal-fetal medicine
specialist 171 was realistic. The defendant-physician very likely would not
have undertaken the delivery even if he had not opted to no longer deliver
babies. The non-disclosure did not increase any risk to the patient. Thus,
her claim was without merit.
F.

Physician Health History

Physicians are patients, too, 172 and, therefore, are entitled to health
information privacy. 173 However, a physician’s health history could create
risk to patients, particularly if the physician’s health is compromised and
might impact the ability to provide quality care. Is the physician under an
obligation to disclose this disease or disability to the patient in order to
obtain the patient’s informed consent? Recent jurisprudence speaks to this
165. Id.
166. Id. at 848.
167. Id.
168. It is not at all clear what was “negative” about an ob-gyn’s decision to no longer deliver
babies.
169. Hooks, 692 S.E.2d at 848.
170. Id. Referring to OCGA § 31-9-6.1(a).
171. “Maternal fetal medicine (MFM) physicians are high risk pregnancy experts, specializing
in the un-routine.” Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine, What is a MFM?,
https://www.smfm.org/members [https://perma.cc/J23A-ZQ6G].
172. See Amy Domeyer-Klenske & Marcy Rosenbaum, When Doctor Becomes Patient: Challenges and Strategies in Caring for Physician-Patients, 44 FAM. MED. 471 (2012).
173. See Lawrence O. Gostin, National Health Information Privacy: Regulations Under the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 285 JAMA 3015 (2001) (discussing the importance of patient information privacy).
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topic. 174
In Robert v. Marx, 175 the Court of Appeal of Louisiana considered
whether a urologist had a duty to disclose his elective eye surgery which
occurred eight days before he performed Plaintiff’s vasectomy. The
defendant-physician had suffered a retinal detachment 176 which he had
successfully surgically repaired. 177 His vision had improved as of the date
of Plaintiff’s surgery, during which the defendant-physician “utilize[d] a
magnifying loupe.” 178
Plaintiff experienced significant postoperative complications
requiring follow-up medical and surgical care. 179 Plaintiff filed a medical
negligence claim based on the lack of informed consent. The trial court
entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant-physician.
On appeal, the court referred to the Louisiana informed consent
statute 180 noting that “a doctor’s duty of disclosure to a patient includes
only those risks that are material.” 181 The court then noted the following
Plaintiff’s
postoperative
significant,
“undisputed
facts”: 182
“complications were known and material risks that might have been
expected from the surgery”; 183 Plaintiff “was advised of [a postoperative]
risk and consented to the surgery”; 184 and the defendant-physician “was
released by his doctor to perform acts in his medical practice.” 185 The
court’s comments suggest that the informed consent disclosure was
appropriate and the defendant-physician’s prior eye condition and surgery
did not constitute a risk to the patient.
Finally, the court made an important distinction between a classic
medical negligence claim and an informed consent claim pertaining to the
case facts as follows: “[A] physician’s inability to perform surgery
because of his impaired physical condition is not a matter concerning
informed consent of the patient but negligence of the physician.” 186 This

174. See also Sarah Haston, Note, Impaired Physicians and the Scope of Informed Consent:
Balancing Patient Safety with Physician Privacy, 41 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1125 (2014).
175. 109 So. 3d 462 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
176. See John Lane et al., Retinal Detachment: Imaging and Surgical Treatments and Complications, 23 RADIOGRAPHICS 983 (2003); Ray F. Gariano et al., Evaluation and Management of Suspected Retinal Detachment, 69 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 1691 (2004).
177. Marx, 109 So. 3d at 464.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 463-464.
180. LA. Rev. Stat. § 40:1299.40.
181. Marx, 109 So. 3d at 466.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 467.
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suggests that a physician is simply not obligated to disclose personal
health information to obtain a patient’s informed consent, even if the
physician’s health would pose a risk to the patient. Presumably, a patient
injured as a result of medical negligence caused by the physician’s
impaired health will learn of the impairment during the pre-trial discovery
process. Of course, this provides little, if any, consolation to a patient who
might well have opted for a different physician.
Another recent examination of an informed consent claim involving
the defendant-physician’s health occurred in Rice v. Brakel. 187 This case
involved a spinal surgery performed by a physician with an apparent
prescription pain medication dependency. 188 The patient came across this
information while researching ‘the Board of Medical Examiners’ website
to check the disciplinary history of a doctor licensed in the state.” 189 This
research also revealed that the defendant-physician “had been
reprimanded by the board and placed on probation for five years.” 190
Plaintiff filed a claim for medical battery, medical malpractice and
negligent supervision. The trial court entered summary judgment on
behalf of the defendant-physician. On appeal, the court discussed all of
these theories. Insofar as the alleged failure of the defendant-physician to
disclose his alleged drug dependence and disciplinary history is
concerned, the court stated that “[Plaintiff] has an available cause of
action for any damages caused by [defendant’s] failure to disclose,
because the duty to disclose relevant risks already exists under the
informed consent theory of medical malpractice.” 191 Nevertheless, the
court also found that Plaintiff had not introduced any evidence to prove
“that he would have declined the treatment had [defendant’s] status been
disclosed” 192 or that the non-disclosure proximately caused any injury. 193
The Court of Appeals of Georgia in Williams v. Booker addressed a
surgeon’s alcohol addiction. 194 Here, the court reviewed the denial of
defendants’ motions for summary judgment pertaining to this addiction.
The defendant-physician had performed a laparoscopic gallbladder
removal 195 for Plaintiff. Postoperatively, it appeared that the Plaintiff had

187. 310 P.3d 16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
188. Id. at 18.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 20.
192. Id. at 22 (citation omitted).
193. Id.
194. 712 S.E.2d 617 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
195. See Jeffrey B. Comitalo, Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy and Newer Techniques of
Gallbladder Removal, 16 J. SOC’Y. LAPAROENDOSCOPIC SURGEONS 406, 406-07 (2012) (explaining
the surgical technique).
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suffered an intraoperative bile duct injury. 196 Plaintiff commenced a
hospital and medical negligence claim, alleging, among other things, “that
[defendant] was addicted to alcohol and that his alcoholism impaired his
ability to perform surgery” 197 and “that the hospital was aware of
[defendant’s] alcohol addiction and violated a duty to disclose [his]
alcohol addiction to her.” 198 The physician-defendant admitted that he was
an alcoholic. 199
The court addressed the relevance of defendant’s addiction, stating
that “[i]n medical malpractice suits, evidence of a physicians’ alcohol or
drug use or addiction is relevant and admissible only when there is
evidence from which the jury may infer that the physician was under the
influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the allegedly negligent
treatment.” 200 Of course, the relevance analysis did not address the issue
of disclosure to obtain informed consent.
As to the informed consent claim against the hospital, the court noted
that Plaintiff provided no authority to support his claim that the hospital
had a duty to inform the patient of a physician’s alcoholism. The court
cited to Georgia jurisprudence holding “that a physician has no duty to
inform a patient of his use and dependence upon the illegal drug
cocaine.” 201 Therefore, there was “no basis for [Plaintiff’s] failure-todisclose claim.” 202 Such a claim could not be prosecuted against the
physician or hospital.
Informed consent claims concerning physician health implicate
sensitive and controversial matters. The most reasonable approach would
support a required disclosure if the physician’s health condition creates a
realistic risk to the patient which would not exist in the absence of that
condition.
G.

Physician’s Relationship with Medical Product Manufacturer and
Financial Interest in Treatment Procedure

In Shapira v. Christiana Care Health Services, Inc. 203, the Supreme
Court of Delaware considered the appeal from a verdict in favor of the
defense in a medical negligence claim involving a thoracic surgeon who

196. Booker, 712 S.E.2s at 619.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 620.
201. Id. at 621 (citing Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland, 272 Ga. 296, 296-297, 528 S.E.2d
777 (2000)).
202. Id. at 622.
203. 99 A.3d 217 (Del. 2014).
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had a financial interest in a product which was used to treat the plaintiff.
Plaintiff “fell from a ladder and suffered multiple non-displaced rib
fractures, among other injuries.” 204 Plaintiff was hospitalized and attended
to by defendant, a thoracic surgeon, who performed a pain management
procedure (called an On-Q procedure) where the surgeon inserted a
catheter over Plaintiff’s ribs through which pain medication was
delivered. 205 The use of the catheter in this procedure was not FDA
approved, constituting “an ‘off-label’ use of the
. . . catheter.” 206
In advance of the procedure, the surgeon would have discussed it
with the patient, including its purpose, “aims, risks and alternatives.” 207
The patient consented to the procedure. However, the surgeon did not
disclose his “independent interest in the . . . procedure.” 208 The court
explained the surgeon’s “interest” in great detail, as follows.
In 2007, Shapira entered into a contract with the On-Q’s manufacturer,
I-Flow Corporation, under which Shapira became a member of I-Flow’s
speaker’s bureau. I-Flow paid Shapira to give presentations to other
physicians about the On-Q procedure, and Shapira created a promotional
pamphlet about the procedure. Also in 2007, Shapira created a database
at Christiana Hospital to collect information about his patients’
responses to the On-Q procedure. Around that time, the number of
patients on whom Shapira performed the On-Q procedure began to
increase significantly. In 2009, Shapira requested and received approval
from CCHS’s Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) to study the
effectiveness of the On-Q procedure using the patient data he was
collecting. By mid-2009, Shapira had labeled himself, in addition to a
thoracic surgeon, an “interventional pain management physician” based
on his frequent performance of the On-Q procedure at Christiana
Hospital. 209

Additionally, and significantly, the surgeon only discussed oral and
intravenous pain medication as an alternative and did not discuss epidural
anesthesia as an option. 210
Post-procedure, the patient suffered complications and required
204. Id. at 219.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 220.
209. Id.
210. Id. See Manoj K. Karmakar, & Anthony M.-H. Ho, Acute Pain Management of Patients
with Multiple Fractured Ribs, 54 J. TRAUMA 615, 616 (2003) (noting multiple approaches to pain
management of fractured ribs, including the epidural approach, which the defendant, Dr. Shapira, did
not discuss with the patient).
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additional surgical procedures. 211 Plaintiff brought a medical negligence
action against the physician including a claim for informed consent. The
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. 212
The state supreme court characterized the informed consent claim as
implicating a conflict of interest, specifically, that the physician-defendant
failed “to disclose significant personal conflicts of interest regarding the
On-Q procedure, including his business relationship with I-Flow.” 213 The
court referred to Delaware’s informed consent statute which defined
informed consent as follows:
[T]he consent of a patient to the performance of health care services by
a health care provider given after the health care provider has informed
the patient, to an extent reasonably comprehensible to general lay
understanding, of the nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and
of the risks and alternatives to treatment or diagnosis which a reasonable
patient would consider material to the decision whether or not to
undergo the treatment or diagnosis. 214

The statute would have required the defendant-physician to present the
Plaintiff with an alternative method of pain management, which he did
not do. Thus the defendant-physician violated the standard of care. 215
As to the surgeon’s financial connection to the pain management
procedure he performed, the court found his connection created a conflict
of interest such that he performed a procedure which benefitted him, “not
because it was the most appropriate procedure.” 216 Furthermore, “the
conflict created a risk that [he] did not disclose or consider all reasonable
alternatives.” 217 The surgeon had the incentive to “play down the risks of
the . . . procedure and play up the problems with alternative
treatments.” 218 Therefore, the non-disclosure increased the risk to the
patient receiving the procedure which might have been avoided had the
patient known of another option.
Shapira is a current example of the issues considered by the
California Supreme Court in Moore v. Regents of the University of
California. 219 It is clear that a physician is obligated to disclose any

211.
212.
213.
214.
425)).
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
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Shapira, 99 A.3d at 220.
Id.
Id. at 221.
Id. (quoting Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 6801 (Lexis Advance through 81 Del. Laws, ch.
Shapira, 99 A.3d at 221.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id.
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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financial interest related to a proposed treatment beyond just the
compensation the physician charges for the medical services rendered.
The financial conflict places a patient at risk of unnecessary medical care
or of more dangerous treatment than necessary.
H.

Off Label Use of Surgical Device

In Seavey v. Globus Medical, 220 the court considered various motions
for summary judgment in product liability and lack of informed consent
claims relating to the use of a surgical fixation device. 221 The surgeon’s
use of the device was “off-label”—a use not approved by the FDA. The
surgeon did not disclose the off-label use of the device to the patient when
obtaining the patient’s consent for the surgical procedure.
Typically, non-disclosure of an off-label use of a medical device
does not violate the doctrine of informed consent. 222 The Seavey trial
judge recognized this principle when he stated:
[W]hen a surgeon uses a medical device in an “off-label” manner, a
failure to disclose that information to the patient is, alone, insufficient to
support a claim that the physician failed to meet the applicable
disclosure standard.. . . “the FDA regulatory status ‘do[es] not speak
directly to the medical issues surrounding a particular surgery.’” This is
the case because the FDA’s “concern is to regulate the marketing and
labelling of medical devices, not to intrude upon the practice of medicine
or redefine the doctrine of informed consent.” Doctors may “use medical
devices for off-label purposes that are not FDA approved, provided that
the FDA has approved the device for some other purpose.” 223

The court also confirmed that New Jersey law was consistent with this
principle. 224
The court, however, did not pronounce a per se rule regarding the
non-disclosure of the FDA regulatory status of a surgical device. It is
possible that FDA regulatory status could recognize a risk to a patient
through an off-label use. If so, that status must be disclosed by the
physician in order to obtain the patient’s informed consent. 225 In addition,
in order to prove the materiality of that risk, the patient must produce
220. Seavy v. Globus Medical Inc., No. 11-2240, 2014 WL 1876957 (D.N.J. 2014).
221. See Dilip K. Sengupta & Harry N. Herkowitz, Pedicle Screw-Based Posterior Dynamic
Stabilization: Literature Review, 2012 ADVANCES ORTHOPEDICS. 1, 4 (2012) (referring to a transition
device which may well have been the subject of the lawsuit).
222. See J.M. Beck & E.D. Azari, FDA, Off Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking
Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 71, 76 (1998).
223. Seavy, No. 11-22402014, 2014 WL 1876957 at *13 (citations omitted).
224. Id. at *14.
225. Id. at *15.
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expert testimony. 226 Plaintiff did not produce that testimony.
I.

Differential Diagnosis—Proper Diagnosis

Not long ago, I authored a detailed paper on informed consent and
the differential diagnosis. 227 The paper examined the experiences of
various jurisdictions and urged that physicians cannot be expected to
disclose the entire differential diagnosis and treatment options (including
risks, benefits and complications) for discarded diagnoses. 228 It also urged
that a doctrine of informed consent which required the disclosure of the
differential diagnosis could yield unnecessary medical procedures and
pose danger to patients. 229 The failure of a physician to arrive at a correct
diagnosis should yield a medical negligence claim, not an informed
consent claim. 230
J.

Physician Experience

Are patients better served by receiving treatment from more
experienced rather than less experienced physicians? It has been reported
that “[e]xperience is strongly related to better outcomes in surgery and
obstetrics, but studies examining association between physician
experience and quality of care for medical patients have reported mixed
results.” 231 If physician experience is related to outcome, does
inexperience or less experience constitute a material risk to a patient
which the physician is obligated to disclose? In other words, is a physician
required to disclose to a patient that a more experienced physician is
available and preferable?
In 2017, the Court of Appeals of Iowa, in Andersen v. Khanna, 232
held that no “Iowa court has explicitly considered whether the doctor’s
inexperience is a material risk or factor that falls within the duty to
disclose.” 233 The court referred to the Iowa informed consent statute 234
and stated that it “is silent as to any physician-specific information that

226. Id. at *16.
227. Marc D. Ginsberg, Informed Consent and the Differential Diagnosis: How the Law Can
Overestimate Patient Autonomy and Compromise Health Care, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 349 (2014).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See Pagani v. Weiss, Nos. 1279 EDA 2013, 1442 EDA 2013, 2014 WL 10965858 (Sup.
Ct. Pa. March 27, 2014).
231. Findlay A. McAlister et al., Physician experience and outcomes among patients admitted
to general internal medicine teaching wards, 187 CMAJ 1041 (2015).
232. No. 14-1682, 2017 WL 363221 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017).
233. Id. at 10.
234. Iowa Code § 147.137(1) (2018).
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must be disclosed to meet the informed-consent requirements.” 235
Therefore, under Iowa law, the defendant’s alleged inexperience (as a
cardiac surgeon) could not support an informed consent claim.
The court of appeals decision was, however, short-lived. In 2018, on
further review by the Supreme Court of Iowa, the Andersen decision was
vacated. 236 The state supreme court focused on the fact that the defendantphysician did not have any experience or training in performing the
particular Bentall procedure 237 used on Andersen. 238 Insofar as Iowa had
adopted a reasonable patient model of informed consent, 239 the Supreme
Court held that a physician’s personal characteristics, including
experience, can be material to a patient’s decision to undertake
treatment. 240 The Supreme Court’s specific holding is as follows:
Accordingly, we hold a physician’s experience or training with the
proposed treatment can be information material to the decision of a
reasonable person in the patient’s position to or not to undergo the
proposed treatment. Whether such information is material will depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case and will be for the jury to
decide, unless as a matter of law no reasonable person in the patient’s
position would find such information material. 241

Of course, the position taken by the Iowa Supreme Court potentially
places many Iowa physicians in peril. There is always a more experienced
physician. How much (or little) experience is material to a reasonable
patient? How will less experienced physicians gain experience if they
must routinely disclose their experience and, presumably, the identities of
more experienced physicians?
In 2015, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in
Lynch v. Pressman 242 came to the same conclusion. Here, the defendantphysician, an orthopedic surgeon (not a hand surgeon) “performed
endoscopic carpal tunnel release (CTR) surgery 243 on Plaintiff’s dominant

235. Khanna, No. 14-1682, 2017 WL 363221 at 10.
236. Andersen v. Khanna, 913 N.W.2d 526, 542 (Iowa 2018).
237. The Bentall procedure refers to “[a] technique for complete replacement of the aortic valve
and ascending aorta in cases of aneurysm of the ascending aorta with aortic valve ectasia.” Hugh
Bentall & Antony De Bono, A Technique for Complete Replacement of the Ascending Aorta, 23
THORAX 338 (1968). See also Christian D. Etz et al., The Bentall Procedure: Is it the Gold Standard?
A Series of 597 Consecutive Cases, 140 J. THORACIC & CARDIOV. SURG. 564 (2010).
238. Khanna, 913 N.W.2d at 530.
239. Id. at 537.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 542.
242. No. L-1650-10, 2015 WL 1237190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 4, 2015).
243. “Carpal tunnel syndrome . . . is the most common compression neuropathy of the upper
extremity.” James C.Y. Chow & Michael E. Hantes, Endoscopic Carpal Tunnel Release: Thirteen
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right hand,” 244 resulting in complications. 245 This resulted in additional
hand surgery, during which “defendant discovered that he had severed
Plaintiff’s common digital nerve 246 in the previous endoscopic procedure,
and performed microscopic repair on the nerve.” 247 Postoperatively, the
complications remained.
Plaintiff’s complaint, including an informed consent claim, alleged
“that defendant never informed her that his experience with performing
endoscopic CTR surgery consisted of less than ten percent of all surgical
procedures that he routinely performed.” 248 Plaintiff claimed that if she
was aware of defendant’s inexperience and the surgical risks she would
not have consented. 249
The informed consent claim went to trial and resulted in a jury
verdict for the defendant. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed. The
surgeon’s “non-disclosure” was not a misrepresentation of his
credentials. 250 The surgeon did not, under New Jersey law, have an
obligation to disclose his surgical experience to obtain the patient’s
informed consent.
K.

Sophisticated Care Facility

A question related to the prior section: Does the doctrine of informed
consent require a physician to disclose to the patient the option of seeking
treatment at a facility which can provide more sophisticated care? In
Torres v. Carrese, 251 the Appellate Court of Connecticut held that this
disclosure is not required.
In Torres, 252 Plaintiff, an obstetrical patient, sued obstetriciangynecologists after delivering a child via cesarean hysterectomy. The
delivery became complicated by a placental condition (placental percreta)
in addition to bleeding. Thus, the plaintiff-patient required a hysterectomy
Years’ Experience with the Chow Technique, 27 J. HAND SURGERY 1011, 1011 (2002) (also explaining the endoscopic surgical technique).
244. Pressman, 2015 WL 1237190, at *1.
245. Id. See Raymond W. Tse et al., Early major complications of endoscopic carpal tunnel
release: A review of 1200 cases, 11 CAN. J. PLAST. SURG. 131 (2003) (a clinical review of complications resulting from endoscopic carpel tunnel release).
246. See Nitin J. Engineer et al., Variations in the Anatomy of the Third Common Digital Nerve
and Landmarks to Avoid Injury to the Third Common Digital Nerve With Carpal Tunnel Release, 8
OPEN ACCESS J. PLAST. SURG. 465, 466 (2008) (explaining that “the common digital nerve of the
third web space was the most frequently injured digital nerve”).
247. Pressman, 2015 WL 1237190, at *1.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at *6.
251. 90 A.3d 256 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014).
252. Id.
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and urologic treatment. 253 The trial court granted summary judgment to
the defendants on Plaintiff’s informed consent claim, which alleged that
the defendant should have disclosed “that the cesarean hysterectomy
could perhaps be more safely performed at another health care facility.” 254
The appellate court affirmed, stating:
None of our courts have addressed a claim closely analogous to the
plaintiff’s—that is, whether a physician has an obligation to inform his
or her patient that a procedure may be better performed at another health
care facility. We hold that on the facts presented in this case, [defendant]
had no such obligation. . . . The procedure itself does not necessarily
extend to the place where the procedure is to be performed; in the
circumstances of this case, the alleged fact that the facility was not a
tertiary facility was not, as a matter of law, a material risk. 255

The appellate court, however, did not preempt possible informed consent
claims, based on different facts, founded on the non-disclosure of
alternative treatment venues. 256 The difficulty here is the notion that a less
sophisticated treatment facility (and its personnel) may constitute a
material risk to a patient. For example, is a community-based physician
required to disclose that a patient would be better served at a university
teaching facility? The point is that there is almost always, a “better”
facility based on reputation, prestige, credentials of staff physicians, and
available training programs. It is simply not possible for every patient to
be referred to a more sophisticated facility. Instead, the failure of a
physician to make an appropriate referral may constitute medical
negligence. Yet “failure” does not fit well with an informed consent
claim.
L.

Disciplinary History

It is well known that disciplinary action against a physician by a state
medical licensing board rarely relates to quality of care issues. 257 When
disciplinary action does result from poor medical care, is the disciplined

253. Id. at 260-61. See also, Robert Washecka & Amanda Behling, Urologic Complications of
Placenta Percreta Invading the Urinary Bladder: A case Report and Review of the Literature, 61
HAW. MED. J. 66 (2002) (explaining placenta percreta and placenta accrete).
254. Carrese, 90 A.3d at 270.
255. Id. at 277.
256. Id., n.36.
257. See Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline,
13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285 (2010) (an analysis of the disciplinary functions of state medical
licensing boards). But see James Morrison & Peter Wickersham, Physicians Disciplined by a State
Medical Board, 279 JAMA 1889 (1998) (reporting on a substantial number of disciplinary matters
relating to “negligence or incompetence.”).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss1/2

32

Ginsberg: Informed Consent

2018]

INFORMED CONSENT

81

physician obligated to disclose this disciplinary history to obtain a
patient’s informed consent? Does this disciplinary action create a risk to
patients? A recent trial court opinion speaks to this issue.
In McBreairty v. Body Cosmetica, 258 the trial court considered a
motion to strike an informed consent claim focusing on a plastic surgeon’s
alleged failure to disclose “that his medical license in New York had been
subject to discipline, and that his medical license was on probation in
Connecticut at the time of the initial consultation [with the patient].” 259
Plaintiff also alleged the surgeon’s non-disclosure of required retraining,
surgical monitoring, consent orders as to his Connecticut medical license,
and various “complaints lodged against him over the years for reasons
relating to patient safety and/or his skills as a plastic surgeon.” 260 Plaintiff
also alleged that the defendant failed to inform her of the risks and
complications of breast augmentation surgery. 261
The court reviewed the Connecticut law of informed consent,
referring to the Duffy v. Flagg 262 factors, including “the risks and hazards
of the procedure,” 263 and stated that Plaintiff’s “allegations certainly
contain provider specific information which a jury could conclude would
be ‘material to a reasonable patient’ so as to trigger a duty to disclose.” 264
Accordingly, Plaintiff “set forth a viable cause of action for informed
consent.” 265
M. Qualifications of Treatment Personnel
Patients who seek surgical care at teaching institutions must accept
that residents under the supervision of attending physicians will
participate in surgery. The Supreme Court in New York recently
emphasized this point in Collado v. New York City Health & Hosp. 266
Here, an attending surgeon and a resident, supervised by the attending
performed an eye surgery on a patient. 267 Surgical complications
occurred. Allegedly the patient was non-compliant with the surgeon’s
medication recommendations. The patient then had subsequent
unsuccessful surgical procedures and lost her vision in one eye. 268
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
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905 A.2d 15 (Conn. 2006).
Id. at 20.
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The court noted that by seeking treatment at the hospital, “[Plaintiff]
‘consented to the customs and practices of that hospital,’ which in
hospitals with residency programs means residents performing supervised
surgeries.” 269 Furthermore, the court held that “[t]here is no requirement
in the context of informed consent to disclose the ‘qualifications of
personnel providing . . . treatment.’” 270
N.

Cost of Treatment

Currently, there are no reported judicial opinions on the topic of
financial informed consent— the required disclosure to the patient of the
cost of recommended treatment. However, this topic has not escaped
scrutiny in medical and legal scholarship. 271 It has been urged that
physicians have an ethical duty to engage patients in discussion of the cost
of treatment 272 because financial informed consent is a component of
patient autonomy. 273 Various explanations have been advanced for why
medical providers do not typically obtain a patient’s financial informed
consent:
• [P]hysicians typically lack accurate information about the cost of
treatment. 274
• Long-standing professional norms prevent discussion of fees before
a physician cares for the sick. 275
• Enormous accounting complexity causes both providers and patients
to lack the capacity to negotiate and assent to a bill. 276

These explanations aside, treatment decisions require physicianpatient information exchange, as recently articulated by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in Silva v. Baptist Health South Florida: 277
There can be no question that the exchange of information between
269. Id. at 470 (citations omitted).
270. Id. at 472 (citation omitted).
271. See Sawicki, supra note 2; see also Christopher Robertson, Should Patient Responsibility
For Costs Change the Doctor-Patient Relationship?, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 363 (2015); see also
Barak D. Richman et al., Overbilling and Informed Financial Consent – A Contractual Solution, 367
N. ENGL. J. MED. 396 (2012); see also Alicia Hall, Financial Side Effect: Why Patients Should Be
Informed of Costs, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 41 (2014); Cf. Timothy A. Caulfield & Diana E. Ginn,
The High Price of Full Disclosure: Informed Consent and Cost Containment in Health Care, 22 Man.
L.J. 328 (1994) (Canadian health care).
272. Sawicki, supra note 2, at 849.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 849-50.
275. Richman et al., supra note 271.
276. Id.
277. 856 F.3d 824 (11th Cir. 2017). (Thanks to Prof. Thaddeus Pope of Mitchell/Hamline Law
School for bringing this opinion to my attention).
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doctor and patient is part-and-parcel of healthcare services. Thus,
regardless of whether a patient ultimately receives the correct diagnosis
or medically acceptable treatment, that patient has been denied the equal
opportunity to participate in healthcare services whenever he or she
cannot communicate medically relevant information effectively with
medical staff. 278

The concept of financial informed consent is consistent with this
principle. 279
VI. DELEGABILITY OF DISCLOSURE
In a recent opinion, which profoundly impacts the Pennsylvania law
of informed consent, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a
physician may not delegate the duty to obtain a patient’s informed consent
to a surgical procedure. 280 Shinal v. Toms concerned a medical negligence
action arising from a neurosurgical procedure to remove “a recurrent nonmalignant tumor from the pituitary region of [Plaintiff’s] brain.” 281
Various surgical options were available, 282 involving total or less than
total removal.
The Plaintiff decided to have surgery but, following a meeting with
the defendant, “the surgical approach had not yet been determined.” 283
During that meeting, the defendant-physician reviewed “the alternatives,
risks, and benefits of total versus subtotal resection.” 284 Thereafter,
Plaintiff had a telephone conversation and a meeting with the defendantphysician’s physician assistant (PA). 285 During these interactions, there
278. Id. at 834.
279. The Appellate Court of Illinois recently decided Turner v. Orthopedic & Shoulder Center,
S.C. involving a patient claim for consumer fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress
“premised on defendant’s charging her more for medical services than the amounts that defendant
had agreed to charge, in its contract with Plaintiff’s health insurer.” 82 N.E.3d 801, 802 (Ill. App. Ct.
2017). The court suggested that Plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of the provider agreement between the health care provider and plaintiff’s insurer. Id. at 808. If so, insured patients may be able to
claim that they are entitled to know the cost of treatment to be paid by insurer to provider—perhaps
only a “half-step” short of financial informed consent.
280. Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429 (Pa. 2017).
281. Id. at 433.
282. See William F. Chandler & Ariel L. Barkan, Treatment of Pituitary Tumors: A Surgical
Perspective, 37 ENDOCRINOL. METAB. CLIN. N. AM. 51 (2008); See also Gregory A. Kaltsas et al.,
Clinical Review: Diagnosis and Management of Pituitary Carcinomas, 90 J. CLIN. ENDOCRINOL
METAB. 3089 (2005).
283. Shinal, 162 A.3d at 434.
284. Id.
285. “PAs are licensed health professionals, certified by a national examination process, who
practice medicine with physician supervision.” Roderick S. Hooker & Linda E. Berlin, Trends in The
Supply Of Physician Assistants and Nurse Practitioners in The United States, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS
174 (2002).
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were discussions about surgery, radiation, and the surgical incision. “The
physician assistant obtained [Plaintiff’s] medical history, conducted a
physical, and provided [Plaintiff] with information relating to the surgery.
[Plaintiff] signed an informed consent form.” 286
The defendant-physician performed “an open craniotomy total
resection of the brain tumor” and “perforated [Plaintiff’s] carotid artery,
which resulted in hemorrhage, stroke, brain injury, and partial
blindness.” 287 A medical negligence lawsuit ensued, “alleging that [the
defendant-physician] failed to obtain [Plaintiff’s] informed consent
for . . . surgery” 288 by “[failing] to explain the risks of surgery to
[Plaintiff] or to offer her the lower risk surgical alternative of subtotal
resection of the benign tumor, followed by radiation.” 289 On appeal, the
state supreme court focused on the Pennsylvania informed consent
statute 290 and the defendant-physician’s position, “that, while it is the
physician’s duty to obtain the patient’s informed consent, the physician is
not required to supply all of the information personally.” 291 The
Pennsylvania informed consent statute, in relevant part, provides as
follows:
(a) Duty of physicians. Except in emergencies, a physician owes a duty
to a patient to obtain the informed consent of the patient or the patient’s
authorized representative prior to conducting the following procedures:
(1) Performing surgery, including the related administration of anes
thesia.
(b) Description of procedure. Consent is informed if the patient has
been given a description of a procedure set forth in subsection (a) and
the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would require
to make an informed decision as to that procedure. The physician shall
be entitled to present evidence of the description of that procedure and
those risks and alternatives that a physician acting in accordance with
accepted medical standards of medical practice would provide. 292

The text of the statute clearly notes that the duty to obtain informed
consent is owed by the physician— the statute is silent on the issue of
delegability of the duty. Nevertheless, the state supreme court emphasized
“that the duty to obtain informed consent belongs solely to the physician

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Shinal, 162 A.3d at 434.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 435.
40 P.S. § 1303.504.504.
Shinal, 162 A.3d at 452.
40 P.S. § 1303.504.
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and that it is non-delegable.” 293 Furthermore, the court, in recognizing
informed consent as more than a disclosure doctrine, stated:
[W]e hold that a physician cannot rely upon a subordinate to disclose
the information required to obtain informed consent. Without direct
dialogue and a two-way exchange between the physician and patient,
the physician cannot be confident that the patient comprehends the risks,
benefits, likelihood of success and alternatives. 294 Were the law to
permit physicians to delegate the provision of critical information to
staff, it would undermine patient autonomy and bodily integrity by
depriving the patient of the opportunity to engage in a dialogue with his
or her chosen health care provider. A regime that would countenance
delegation of the informed consent process would undermine the
primacy of the physician-patient relationship. Only by personally
satisfying the duty of disclosure may the physician ensure that consent
truly is informed. 295

Of course, the Pennsylvania informed consent statute, even if
presumably requiring the non-delegable disclosure by the physician,
simply does not suggest an informed consent dialogue, discussion, or
conversation. The court in Shinal has engrafted that process on to the
statute by judicial interpretation and stated, “[i]nformed consent requires
direct communication between physician and patient, and contemplates a
back-and-forth, face-to-face exchange, which might include questions
that the patient feels the physician must answer personally before the
patient feels informed and becomes willing to consent.” 296
It will be interesting to determine if the Shinal opinion influences
other courts to adopt its interpretation of the doctrine of informed consent,
expanding it beyond a disclosure doctrine. How a court is able to analyze
the communication process and patient understanding remains to be seen.
VII. REFERRING PHYSICIAN AND INFORMED CONSENT
On appeal from a denial of a physician’s motion for summary
judgment, a New York state appellate court recently pronounced that a
referring physician may be subject to an informed consent claim. 297 In
Odoardi v. Abramson, 298 plaintiff brought a medical negligence action
arising from laser eye surgery. The appellant-physician urged “that he

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
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Id.

37

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 2

86

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:1

cannot be liable on a claim for lack of informed consent because he was
merely a referring physician.” 299 This argument failed on appeal as
“unpersuasive in light of the evidence that he comanaged plaintiff’s care
and that the Lasik surgeon specifically relied upon Dr. Liberatore’s
examination to clear Plaintiff for the surgery.” 300
The brief opinion in Odoardi provides no specific analysis as to how
a non-operating physician would obtain informed consent for a procedure
he did not perform. Of concern would be the possibility of inconsistent
disclosures by multiple physicians and patient confusion.
VIII. AN EVIDENTIARY ISSUE: ADMISSIBILITY OF THE INFORMED
CONSENT DISCLOSURE IN A NON-INFORMED CONSENT MEDICAL
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
Quite recently, courts have considered an interesting evidentiary
issue. Are the details of an informed consent disclosure relevant in a noninformed consent medical negligence claim? Evidence of this disclosure
might be offered by plaintiff or defendant-physician if relevant to
establishing compliance with or deviation from the standard of care. Keep
in mind that relevance as defined by the Federal Rules of Evidence (and
similar state rules) reflects a rather low bar to hurdle. Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 provides that “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the
action.” 301 “Essentially, Rule 401 requires that there be a logical
relationship between the evidence sought to be introduced and a ‘fact . . .
of consequence’ in the case.” 302
It may, therefore, be reasonable to propose a logical connection
between the information disclosed by the physician and the physician’s
recognition of the standard of care. The informed consent disclosure
suggests that the physician is capable (or incapable) of understanding the
treatment or procedure which has been recommended.
The FRE 401 inquiry does not end the analysis because not all
relevant evidence is admissible, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403,
which provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its
299. Id. Presumably, the appellant-physician was not the surgeon; however, he is an ophthalmologist. About Dr. Benjamin Liberatore, https://health.usnews.com/doctors/benjamin-liberatore68161 (last visited 12/13/17); St. John’s Riverside Hospital, https://doctors.riversidehealth.org/details/423/benjamin-liberato [https://perma.cc/HX7Y-5E9M].
300. Odoardi, 42 N.Y.S. at 1.
301. FED. R. EVID. 401.
302. Martin A. Schwartz et al., Trial Evidence 2011: Advocacy, Analysis, & Illustrations, 28
TOURO L. REV. 1, 2 (2012).
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probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of
the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” 303 A trial court may have concern that evidence of informed
consent in a non-informed consent medical negligence trial might suggest
to the jury that the plaintiff’s awareness of risks and complications of a
procedure or treatment indicates that the plaintiff consented to negligent
treatment. 304 Under these circumstances, relevant evidence (the informed
consent disclosure) is legitimately excluded from evidence pursuant to
FRE 403. 305
Two very recent decisions worthy of comment are Ehrlich v.
Sorokin 306 and Wilson v. Patel. 307 In Ehrlich, Plaintiff filed a medical
negligence action, without an informed consent claim, following
complications from a colonoscopy. 308 At trial, over Plaintiff’s objections,
the trial court held that the informed consent disclosure was relevant to
the standard of care. 309 Additionally, “the trial judge allowed the jury to
review Plaintiff’s informed consent documents as part of its
deliberation.” 310 The jury returned a defense verdict.
On appeal, the appellate court noted that New Jersey case law had
not yet addressed “the admissibility of informed consent evidence where
the plaintiff has only asserted a claim of negligent treatment.”311 After
reviewing the case law of various jurisdictions, the appellate court
concluded that the informed consent evidence was inadmissible, and its
admission was reversible error. 312 The appellate court essentially based its
determination on a relevance analysis, including the danger that
admissibility may lead the jury to believe that the patient’s consent to the
procedure implies consent to an injury. 313
Wilson 314 involved a medical negligence claim following
complications of esophageal dilation, requiring reparative thoracic
surgery. Plaintiff claimed that the defendant-physician performed an
unnecessary procedure—Plaintiff neither claimed lack of informed
303. FED. R. EVID. 403.
304. See Brady v. Urbas, 111 A.3d 1155, 1162 ( Pa. 2015).
305. FED. R. EVID. 403.
306. 165 A.3d 812 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).
307. 517 S.W.3d 520 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 2017).
308. See Theodore R. Levin et al., Complications of Colonoscopy in an Integrated Health Care
Delivery System, 147 ANN. INTERN. MED. 212 (2007).
309. Ehrlich, 165 A.3d at 816.
310. Id. at 817.
311. Id. at 818.
312. Id. at 819.
313. Id. at 820.
314. 517 S.W.3d 520 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 2017).
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consent nor did the defendant-physician raise an affirmative defense
based on informed consent. 315 Defendant’s counsel referred to informed
consent during opening statement, cross-examined Plaintiff on this topic
and referred to informed consent during defendant’s direct
examination. 316 The judge provided the jury a consent form to examine
during deliberations and the jury returned a defense verdict. 317
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri identified the informed
consent evidentiary issue as one of first impression.318 After reviewing
decisions from other jurisdictions 319 the court stated that it “joins the
chorus of other state supreme courts and holds that evidence of alleged
informed consent is irrelevant and can only mislead the jury in a medical
malpractice case based on negligent performance of care and
treatment.” 320
In Brady v. Urbas, 321 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered
this issue in a podiatry negligence case, not including an informed consent
claim. The defendant-podiatrist performed four surgical procedures,
obtaining Plaintiff’s consent for each. Plaintiff alleged negligence in the
last three procedures. At trial, Plaintiff moved in limine to exclude
evidence of her surgical consents, based on relevance and prejudice. The
judge denied the motion. The defendant-podiatrist had urged that the
evidence was relevant to Plaintiff’s “credibility as a witness and to her
state of mind at the time of the surgeries.” After a jury verdict for the
defendant-podiatrist and a reversal on appeal, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed, noting that “the fact that a patient may have agreed
to a procedure in light of the known risks does not make it more or less
probable that the physician was negligent in either considering the patient
an appropriate candidate for the operation or in performing it in the postconsent timeframe.” 322 This, of course, is a relevance analysis pertaining
to the podiatrist’s conduct.
The Court of Appeals of Nebraska considered the same issue in
Hillyer v. Midwest Gastrointestinal Associates. 323 Here, Plaintiff alleged
that her colon was perforated during a colonoscopy performed by the

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Id. at 522.
Id.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 524-25.
Id. at 526.
111 A.3d 1155, 1162 (Pa. 2015).
Id. at 1162.
883 N.W.2d 404 (Neb. Ct. App. 2016).
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defendant. 324 Additional serious complications resulted. 325 At trial, the
court admitted evidence of the defendant’s “discussions with [Plaintiff]
and other patients regarding risks and complications associated with
colonoscopies.” 326 The defendant “was allowed to testify that with every
patient, he goes through the list of complications and risks for the
procedure, including perforations and the potential need for surgery.” 327
Although the court of appeals did not adopt a per se rule of inadmissibility
after reviewing the law of other jurisdictions, it did “hold, as a matter of
first impression, that evidence of risk-of-procedure or risk-of-surgery
discussions with the patient is generally irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial
where the plaintiff alleges only negligence, and not lack of informed
consent.” 328 Therefore, the court of appeals holding implicates both the
logical connection of the evidence to medical negligence and the potential
prejudice to Plaintiff even if the evidence is relevant.
It is likely that the “substance” of the informed consent disclosure
(discussion) can be admissible to prove the defendant-physician’s
knowledge or ignorance of the standard of care if the litigants simply are
prohibited by the trial court from linking the proposed medical
treatment/procedure, risks, and complications to the patient’s consent in a
non-informed consent case. In this fashion, the focus is on the physician’s
awareness of the applicable standard of care and the jury will not be
inclined to believe that the patient “consented” to the alleged medical
negligence. 329
IX. CONCLUSION
The intent of this paper is to explore the landscape of the
unconventional aspects of informed consent, focusing primarily on the
physician’s duty to disclose. The law of informed consent has continued
to develop since Canterbury v. Spence, 330 implicating issues certainly not
contemplated more than forty-five years ago. I suspect the doctrine may
continue to expand and yield scholarship on topics not previously
examined in depth.

324. Id. at 407.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 408.
328. Id. at 412.
329. For other judicial opinions adopting this approach, see Baird v. Owczarek, 93 A.3d 1222
(Del. 2014); Warren v. Imperia, 287 P.3d 1128 (Or. Ct. App. 2012); Schwartz v. Johnson, 49 A.3d
359 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012); Hayes v. Camel, 927 A.2d 880 (Conn. 2007); Wright v. Kaye, 593
S.E.2d 307 (Va. 2004).
330. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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In a sense, informed consent is a legal doctrine which intrudes on the
practice of medicine. The case law discussed in this paper imposes
disclosure requirements on physicians by courts—courts which, typically,
are not students of medicine. 331 The results (overbreadth of the doctrine)
are potentially disastrous for physicians and patients, as occurred some
years ago in Wisconsin. 332
As the examination of informed consent continues, so should the
analysis of whether true informed consent is possible or desired by most
patients. For an accurate analysis, courts must be mindful of both
medicine and the law.

331. Of course, the court may interpret informed consent statutes, promulgated by legislators
who, typically, are not students of medicine.
332. See Ginsberg, supra note 227.
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